

## **INMM/ESARDA WORKSHOP 30 OCTOBER – 2 NOVEMBER 2005**

### **“CHANGING THE SAFEGUARDS CULTURE”**

#### **Views on and Expectations from the Workshop**

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“Safeguards culture” is usually thought of in terms of the internal IAEA culture, in particular the approach towards safeguards implementation. Safeguards culture is a product of its institutional context—the terms and interpretation of the relevant treaties and agreements; the available verification methodologies; the shared attitudes and values of the Agency; recruitment, training and retention of inspection staff; management practices; and so on. Safeguards culture therefore is influenced not only the safeguards staff, but by other areas of the Agency. Safeguards culture is also influenced by Member States—at both diplomatic and SSAC level. And safeguards culture is influenced by professional peer groups—this is where INMM and ESARDA have a key role.

For some time members of the safeguards community have been pointing to the need for change in safeguards culture. Some of the factors involved were identified in SAGSI’s Review of the Safeguards Criteria, which I will quote from:

“The rigidities in traditional safeguards implementation are the result of uniformity—a particular vision of achieving non-discrimination under the conditions of traditional safeguards. Under integrated safeguards, in addition to adaptability in developing State Level Approaches, the broadening of available verification measures will require greater adaptability at the implementation level—more options will be available to inspectors, there will be less emphasis on routine inspection activities. Verification activities directed at the possibility of undeclared activities involve new ways of thinking.

Moving from uniform implementation strictly defined by criteria involves moving to a result-oriented culture, whilst upholding non-discrimination values. This will also require greater application of expert judgment and decision-making at all stages and levels of safeguards implementation. .... major change is also required in safeguards evaluation.”

Of course it would be wrong to denigrate the traditional safeguards culture—this has had a number of very positive attributes:

- Thorough
- Systematic
- Unbiased
- Non-discriminatory
- Auditable
- Inspector-independent—to a large extent an inspection produced the same result regardless of the personal characteristics of the inspector performing the inspection.

However, the traditional safeguards culture also had some negative characteristics:

- Rigid
- Mechanistic in application—regardless of cost

- Strictly uniform in application—regardless of whether this uniformity made contextual sense
- Blind to context—following the rigidly defined path, not questioning what lies beyond the closed door
- Inspector-independent—to a large extent the inspection process worked at the level of the lowest common denominator.

The direction of safeguards development now is to diversify from the exclusive focus on declared nuclear material. Verifying declared inventories continues to be important—under traditional safeguards, detection of diversion was the principal indicator of undeclared nuclear activities, and it is essential to maintain an effective capability for the timely detection of diversion. Further, the cases of non-compliance that have come to light all included misuse of safeguarded facilities. But it is now appreciated that addressing the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities involves much more than verifying declared inventories and facilities. The issue of cost-efficiency has also come to the fore. The level of safeguards activity must have a finite limit, a way of defining when enough is enough—and the safeguards budget is finite. So, there is a need to optimise safeguards activity—but to do so in a way that maintains and improves safeguards effectiveness.

A central element in contemporary safeguards is the State Level Approach. This involves a much broader range of information than encompassed by traditional safeguards. The kind of factors that can be taken into account, and the appropriate methodology for doing this, are very much work in progress. Already it is obvious that safeguards require a wider range of disciplines and skills than required under the traditional system, including information analysis, imagery analysis, and environmental analysis. To draw these together, and to optimise safeguards approaches and implementation, requires new decision-making skills, the application of expert judgment. Also required are review or QA processes to ensure this qualitative form of safeguards meets necessary standards of performance and outcome.

These developments also require cultural change on the part of states. A broadening of information and access requires a broadening of cooperation. The days when states could simply do the minimum required under their safeguards agreements are over, though perhaps as yet this is not widely appreciated. The new demands on states are not simply the result of safeguards development, but arise from the expectations of states themselves, as expressed e.g. in Security Council Resolution 1540. SSACs have to become more proactive, it is no longer the case that undeclared nuclear activities, if any, are confined to states themselves. The danger of activities by sub-state actors emphasises the need for states and the IAEA to work in close partnership.

While the need for change is recognised, this is neither a universal recognition, nor at this stage has a new culture emerged. Just as the traditional culture took decades to evolve, establishing the new culture will take time. However, we don't have the luxury of unlimited time, the pressures on the safeguards system, requiring new responses, are upon us now—rather than relying on gradual evolution, the process of change must be consciously directed.

The challenge of achieving the necessary change in safeguards culture falls not only to the Agency and states, but also on the safeguards community in general, including through the work of our professional organisations. Workshops such as this, bringing together all these sectors of the safeguards community, have a particularly important contribution to make.